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BUT, WHY DO WE SHOOT
HORSES?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT
TO DIE AND EUTHANASIA
Scenario 1: Imagine you are a healthy adult, living life to its
fullest. You have a successful career and a loving family-he
American dream. One cool autumn afternoon, you start experiencing
some weakness in your hands while playing with your seven-year-old
daughter. It is not too painful, so you dismiss it as mere fatigue from
the hectic week before. Throughout the next several weeks,
however, you start experiencing more and more weakness,
accompanied by cramping and stiffness. Finally, after a couple of
months you consult your family physician, and after a battery of
tests, you are diagnosed with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, more
commonly as Lou Gehrig's Disease.' How is this possible? You
have always taken care of yourself. This is not fair. You have just
begun to live your life.
After consulting literature on this deadly disease, you realize
that your future is not as bright as you once thought. The disease
starts with the wasting of the muscles, and gradually overtakes
virtually all normal functions.2 You see yourself losing the ability to
walk, eat, and to hold your only daughter. Eventually, you will not
be able to speak, swallow, or move.' However, this is not the worst
of it. This heartless disease spares your awareness and intellect;
there is no loss of sensation. 4 This disease usually leads to death in
two to four years, but some victims live more than twenty years after
diagnosis, often with constant physical and emotional pain.'
The disease is progressing now. The physical pain is
excruciating, but you can handle that. The most distressing part is
watching your family watch you degenerate into a shell of existence.
You decide that you want to spare your family and yourself the

'AMA,
Id.

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 696 (Charles B. Clayman ed., 1989).
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4Id.
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emotional heartbreak accompanying your deterioration. You have a
long talk with your family, and you all agree that the suffering is not
worth the seemingly endless pain. As a family, you decide you want
a dignified death, but due to the debilitating effects of this disease
you are powerless to end the suffering. Your family enlists the help
of your physician. Can he help you?
Scenario 2: Imagine the same facts as before. However, now
you are at the point where you need feeding tubes and a ventilator to
keep you alive. Again, as a family, you reach the same conclusion
as in Scenario 1, that it is not worth the suffering and you enlist your
physician's help. Can he help you?
Unfortunately, the answer to only one of these scenarios is
yes.6
L Introduction
This Note is not about the law, medicine, or ethics, although
each plays a vital role in the true understanding of the subject. It is
about life, and death, and individuals that are faced with a "deeply
personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality." 7 This
deeply personal decision has been termed the "right to die," which,
for the time being, will encompass the right to die and the right to die
with assistance, or "voluntary active euthanasia." However, in order
to fully understand and discuss this subject, you must experience the
emotions and hardships of being a terminally ill individual in constant
physical and emotional pain. Otherwise, the best one can do is
explain the current basic understandings prevalent in today's society.

6 An individual does have a right to refuse lifesaving treatment, as in Scenario 2.

See infra part II.A. However, the answer to Scenario 1 is not so clear. See Compassion
in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (holding that "a
competent, terminally ill adult has a constitutionally guaranteed right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to commit physician-assisted suicide"), rev'd, 1995 WL 94679
(9th Cir. 1995). Although the Compassion in Dying case has been reversed, the
plaintiffs are seeking a rehearing. See Assisted Suicide-Rehearing Sought in Ninth
Circuit on Panel'sAssisted Suicide Ruling, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Mar. 29, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
7 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
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This Note attempts to do that, and only that. To truly understand the
right to die, you must live it-a fact that escapes the majority of
scholars that discuss such a right.'
Before discussing voluntary active euthanasia, Part II will first
analyze the right-to-die movement, and will give a brief history of
what recognition this right has received under the Constitution and
under the common law. Part II will also discuss how the right is
exercised, what its limits are, and who receives the benefit of such
a right.
Part III will analyze the landmark Supreme Court decision,
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,9 and how the

Court has interpreted the right to die. This discussion will focus on
the individual's interests versus the State's interest, and the reasoning
behind the "clear and convincing" standard, as viewed by the
majority and two of the dissenters in Cruzan. This section will close
with post-Cruzan developments in the right-to-die movement.
Part IV will then focus on the jump from the narrow
interpretation of the right to die under Cruzan to a more broad
interpretation that encompasses the right to die with assistance, if
necessary, or voluntary active euthanasia. This Part will analyze the
unjust terms used in today's society, and will offer a more
compassionate way to view this area. Next, this Part will discuss the
limitations, as well as the arguments for and against the right to die.
This Note will then conclude with some closing thoughts on this
highly controversial and deeply personal subject.
I. The Right-To-Die Background
The right to die has evolved over time into a legal, moral,
and ethical issue. This evolution began when doctors and lawmakers

S"'They don't realize how bad the pain is, of course, they would never realize it,
unless they were going through it themselves, but their job is to keep their patients alive
for as long as they can." Primetime Live: Benny's Choice-Childrenand the Right to
Decide (ABC television broadcast, July 7, 1994) (quoting Benito "Benny" Agrelo, a
courageous fifteen-year-old Florida teenager who refused lifesaving medical treatment
after years of constant pain and suffering).
' 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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started the debate about withholding extraordinary life support in
critical situations.'" The debate then shifted to withholding versus
withdrawing extraordinary life support when medical conditions
looked hopeless." As in withholding extraordinary life support,
withdrawing extraordinary life support was seen as "letting nature
take its course," or accepting that the patient is "really dying from the
disease. "12
Withdrawing life support originally started with the
withdrawal of an artificial ventilator from terminal, comatose, and
incompetent patients." But the legal and medical community began
to realize that these were not the only patients who had rights. Some
"patients in really bad condition were not dependent on any
extraordinary medical support that could be withdrawn so as to enable
them to die."' 4 Thereafter, non-extraordinary life support therapy
was being withdrawn.'" Finally, it became acceptable to withdraw
life saving hydration and nourishment in order to let nature take its
course.' 6 Although the Supreme Court found this right to be
constitutionally protected, 7 other courts have found the right to die
under the common law. 8

10See K. Danner Clouser, The Challenge for Future Debate on Euthanasia, 6 J.
PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 306, 306 (1991).
11Id.
12 Id.

at 307.

13Id.
14Id.

11See Clouser, supra note 10, at 307 (listing cardiopulmonary resuscitation,
antihypertensives, and antibiotics as some of the non-extraordinary life support that was
being withdrawn).
16

Id.

U.S. at 265.
I8 See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 416-17 (Mo. 1988) (en banc)

17 Cruzan, 497

(explaining that under common law, there is an individual liberty right to protect ones
bodily integrity), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.) (holding that the right to refuse medical
treatment stems from the doctrine of informed consent), cert denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981); see also Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977) (finding that the right to refuse treatment stems from the doctrine of
informed consent as well as the constitutional right to privacy).
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A. The Constitutional and Common Law Basis
For the Right to Die
The Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to die.
However, this right has been found to be encompassed in the
constitutional right to privacy. 9 The constitutional right to personal
privacy has been recognized by the Supreme Court in situations
dealing with abortion, contraception, and marriage.2" This right
mandates that "[w]e have a right simply to be private, which depends
on the power to exclude unwarranted and uninvited intrusions or
disclosures."21 The right to privacy has its roots in the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 22 and is "the inseparable
guarantor of our constitutional way of life." 23 Without it, there is no
way of life, just a mandatory way to live.
The right to privacy was originally the right relied on by most

"See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v.
N.J., 429 U.S. 922 (1976). However, the Supreme Court found that the constitutional
right to die should, more appropriately, be evaluated under the liberty interest of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7. "Although many state courts
have held that a right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional
right of privacy, we have never so held. We believe this issue is more properly
analyzed in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest." Id.; see U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law"). For a constitutional analysis of the right to die
under the liberty interest, see infra part Ill. A-B.
20 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy under
certain conditions); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding the right to
privacy encompasses the right of the individual "to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding
the right to privacy extends to the private possession of obscene material in one's home);
Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding the unwritten right to privacy exists
in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights).
21Giles R. Scofield, Privacy (or Liberty) and Assisted Suicide, 6 J. PAIN &
SYMPTOM MGMT.280, 281 (1991).
' Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
2 Scofield, supra note 21, at 281-82 (stating further that privacy "allows us to be
with ourselves, and thereby to be ourselves").
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courts when they found a constitutional right to die.'
The New
Jersey Supreme Court relied on the right to privacy when it decided
In re Quinlan.25 Karen Ann Quinlan sustained extensive physical
injuries which rendered her incompetent.26 Thereafter, Karen's father
wished to be appointed her guardian, and further sought express
authorization to discontinue all extraordinary life support.27 Mr.
Quinlan was opposed by a court appointed guardian ad litem, the
treating physicians, the hospital, the county prosecutor, and the state
attorney general.2" The Quinlan court ultimately held that
"[piresumably [the right to privacy] is broad enough to encompass a
patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain
circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain
conditions." 29 The court permitted the withdrawal of life support as

long as there was a consensus that Karen would never recover.30
After the Quinlan decision, other courts have held that the
right to privacy encompasses the right to forego life sustaining
treatment. 31 For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that ' [t]he constitutional right to privacy ... is an expression of
the sanctity of . . . life . . . . The value of life as so perceived is

lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to

24 These courts drew "upon federal constitutional precedents dealing with
reproductive rights and . .. with [the] control of one's body." ALAN MEISEL, THE
RIoHT To DiE § 3.4, at 52 (1989).
2'355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. N.J., 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
26Id. at 651.
27 Id.

28id.

I Id. at 663 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 153).
30Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 672. The court also held that no civil or criminal liability
would attach to such a procedure. Id.

3' See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 586 (D.R.I. 1988); In re Farrell, 529
A.2d 404, 410 (N.J. 1987); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (Wash. 1987); Corbett v.
D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. Ct. App.), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331
(Fla. 1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984); In re Ingram,
689 P.2d 1363, 1368 (Wash. 1984); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 68 Ohio 1, 9
(Ct. C.P. 1980).
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allow a competent human being the right of choice. "32 Therefore, an
individual has a constitutionally protected right to privately choose a
course of treatment without interference."
However, after Quinlan, courts were reluctant to base their
decisions solely on the right to privacy, and increasingly relied upon
the common law right to autonomy, or self-determination, when
deciding if a right to die existed.3 4 The common law basis for the
right to die has been defined as the right to control one's own body."
This definition's roots stretch back over a century to when the
Supreme Court declared: "No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others . . . . "' Therefore, the
Constitution is not the only foundation upon which this right is based.
At common law, it was considered an assault and a trespass
to be touched without lawful consent.37 This lawful consent doctrine
developed into what is commonly referred to as the doctrine of
informed consent, and encompasses the right of every human being,
of adult years and sound mind, to determine what shall be done with

32 Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426.

The individual at issue in Saikewicz was a

profoundly retarded elderly man who had an IQ of 10, and a mental age of two years
and eight months. Id. at 419. Mr. Saikewicz was diagnosed with myeloblastic
monocytic leukemia, which is fatal and for which treatment causes serious and painful
side effects. Id. at 420. The trial judge carefully weighed all the evidence and decided
the negative factors outweighed the positive ones. and ordered that no treatment be
administered. Id. at 422. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the trial
court's ruling. Id. at 435.
IId. at 427.
See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 3.4, at 52; In re Eichner, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup.
Ct. 1979) (finding that an individual's right to self determination, as opposed to a right
to privacy, permitted him to withdraw unwanted medical treatment), modified, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 1980).
35 MEISEL, supra note 24, at 50-51.
s Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). The Botsford Court,
quoting Judge Cooley, stated that "'[tihe right to one's person may be said to be a right
of complete immunity: to be let alone.'" Id.
37 Id. at 252.
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his or her body.38 The doctrine of informed consent "envisions that
if patients are to 'chart their own course understandably,' there must
be a collaborative, mutual, or shared decision-making between
physician and patient."39 The physician is schooled and experienced
in the art of medicine, but is not intimately familiar with an
individual's beliefs, values, hopes and aspirations.4" However, the
converse is also true. The patient is intimately familiar with his or
her own person, but ordinarily is not experienced in medicine.4
Therefore, both the physician and the patient have "an essential role
to play" when deciding on the course of treatment to pursue.4 2 The
basic goal of informed consent is to enable patients to make rational
and intelligent decisions so as to fully exercise their right to selfdetermination.43
Whether the right to die is grounded in the constitutional right
to privacy or the common-law right to self-determination, this right
is not absolute." The right to die only exists when the benefit of lifesustaining treatment is outweighed by the burden it imposes on the
individual, and when the state cannot show any compelling interest
against removal of such treatment.4

' See Schloendorff v. N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). A general
definition of informed consent includes the duty of a physician to disclose to his patient
all risks of injury that the patient may incur from a proposed course of treatment so that
the patient may make an intelligent decision when facing the choice of undergoing the
proposed treatment, or deciding on an alternative treatment, or no treatment at all.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 537 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991).
39 MEISEL, supra note 24, § 2.3, at 19 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 781 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)).
'0 Id. at 20.
41 id.
42 Id. at 19-20.
4 Id. at 20-21. "[The] right to self determination has been described as an
individual's 'strong . ..personal interest in directing the course of his own life, an
individual's right to behave and act as he deems fit, provided that such behavior and
activity do not conflict with the precepts of society."' In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 453
(N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., concurring) (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1228 (N.J.
1985)).
" See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 588 (D.R.I. 1988).
45Id.

1994]

EUTHANASIA

123

B. Limitations on the Right to Die
1. The Benefit-Burden Approach
The benefit-burden approach essentially weighs the positive
factors an individual would experience from the life prolonging
treatment against the negative factors such treatment would inflict. 4
When analyzing the benefit and the burden of life sustaining
treatment, the courts have generally looked at the patient's ability to
cooperate, the adverse side effects of treatment, the probability of
recovery, if and to what extent the treatment will cause immediate
suffering, and the quality of life if the treatment brings about
recovery.41 If the benefit outweighs the burden, the life sustaining
treatment should be continued.48 Unfortunately, in many situations
the burden is just too great, and the "negative factors of treatment
exceed the benefit. "49 In such situations, it would be better to forego
any further treatment because letting the disease run its course will
usually result in less pain and suffering.5"
This benefit-burden analysis describes the proportionate
treatment as one that "has at least a reasonable chance of providing
benefits to the patient, which benefits outweigh the burdens attendant

' Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 422
(Mass. 1977) (discussing the probate judge's conclusion that "the negative factors of
treatment exceed the benefits," and, therefore, that no treatment should be administered).
17 See id. This benefit-burden analysis has been rejected by some courts when it is
applied in cases where the individual is comatose. See In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 157
(Del. Ch. 1980) (finding that patient in a coma suffering from severe brain damage
"does not suffer discomfort and does not feel pain"); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 338
(Minn. 1984) (finding that for patients that are permanently unconscious, "[d]isability
is total and no return to an even minimal level -of social or human functioning is
possible").
I See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (holding
that, because the patient was not terminally ill, would have a life of relatively normal
duration and the burdens of treatment were not excessive, the state's interest in
preserving life outweighed the patient's right to refuse treatment), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
41 Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 422.
" Id. at 420-21 (finding that as a result of the decedent's age, he would have more
difficulty tolerating chemotherapy treatment; moreover, the treatment would be less
successful for people over 60 than for younger people).
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to the treatment. 5 If the proposed treatment is only minimally
painful or intrusive but the prognosis is virtually hopeless, the
procedure may be considered disproportionate to the potential benefits
the patient would receive.5 2 Such a determination can only be made
by looking at the specific facts of a particular case because burdens
and benefits are unique to each patient.53
The indignity which mentally competent, as well as
incompetent, patients must suffer by not allowing nature to take its
course can also constitute a substantial burden. Furthermore, the
embarrassment, humiliation, and helplessness accompanying terminal
illnesses are personal and unique to each individual.
"It is
incongruous, if not, monstrous, for medical practitioners to assert
their right to preserve a life that someone else must live, or, more
accurately, endure, for 15 to 20 years."5 4 Such an intrusion is a
direct violation of a patient's constitutional right to privacy, right to
self-determination, and right to freedom of choice.55
Perhaps the most controversial term used when discussing the
benefit-burden approach is "quality of life. "56 Quality of life includes
concerns regarding human dignity, physical fitness, autonomy, and

SI

Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Ct. App. 1983).

52 Id.

" See id. at 492. "[T]he determination as to whether the burdens of treatment are
worth enduring for any individual patient depends on the facts unique to each case,
namely, how long the treatment is likely to extend life and under what conditions." Id.
54Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Ct. App. 1986). The Bouvia
court went further, and stated that it "cannot conceive it to be the policy of this state to
inflict such an ordeal upon anyone." Id.
11See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. Ct. App.), approved, 379 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980). "Such a course of conduct invades the patient's constitutional right
of privacy, removes [her] freedom of choice and invades [her] right to selfdetermination." Id.
56 See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 9.31, at 296. Quality of life has been interpreted
in two distinct ways:
(1) the quality of life to one's self, which is viewed as a legitimate
factor when deciding right to die cases; and (2) the quality of life to
others or to society, which is uniformly rejected by courts because
they believe this would be a "step towards active voluntary
euthanasia.

1994]

EUTHANASIA

125

other areas of personal well being.57 This term often compares the
individual's present condition with what he or she had before life
prolonging treatment was required. 8 However, courts are illequipped to handle such determinations,"9 and they will often not
permit "anyone to decide when another should die on any basis other
than clear and convincing evidence. "I Moreover, the quality of life
one individual chooses does not mandate that all individuals, similarly
situated, must live the same way. The only person who can decide
if a life is worth living is the individual who has to live that life or
the people that know the individual best-his or her family6" and/or
close friends. 2
The benefit-burden analysis helps put the life prolonging
treatment in perspective with regard to individual patients. However,
after concluding that the burdens of treatment outweigh the benefits,
the decision-making process generally is not at an end.63 Usually, the
court will weigh the individual's interests against those of the state
and, depending on the findings, either permit the removal or direct
the continuation of the life prolonging treatment."

" See Julia Pugliese, Don'tAsk-Don't Tell: The SecretPracticeof Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1291, 1312 (1993).
" See Margaret A. Somerville, The Song ofDeath: The Lyrics of Euthanasia, 9 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 28 (1993).
59 See Stephen A. Newman, Treatment Refusalsfor the Critically and Terminally Illk
ProposedRules for the Family, the Physician, and the State, 3 N.Y.L. ScH. HUM. RTs.
ANN. 35, 47-48 (1985) (stating that "[c]ourts are too inaccessible and slow ... to spend
time inquiring into the patient's life, philosophy, and value preferences").
' DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Ky. 1993).
61 See Newman, supra note 59, at 47 (noting that "[i]nvolved family members are
both readily accessible and possessed of enough knowledge about the patient to make the
necessary decisions").
"See In re Eichner, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580, 588 (Sup. Ct. 1979) ("[In appropriate
circumstances, an individual other than a relative may be appointed to the committee
even though surviving relatives can be located. The factor of paramount importance is
what the best interest and welfare of the incompetent require. "), modified, 426 N.Y.S.2d
517 (App. Div. 1980).
"See Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference With the Right to Die: The Wrongful
Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625, 631-32 (1986).
. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985).
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2. The Individual-State Interest Approach
The individual-state balancing test assumes there are
competing interests at stake when deciding whether to forego life
sustaining treatment. 6' The individual's interests lie in autonomy,
self-determination, privacy, and bodily integrity, while the state's
interests lie in the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the
protection of third parties, and the ethical integrity of the medical

profession.66 There is a presumption in the individual's favor, and
the state can only override this presumption by demonstrating a
compelling countervailing interest. 67 Therefore, the individual's
choice must prevail where a compelling state interest is not
established.68
The most important state interest countervailing the removal
of lifesaving treatment is the interest in the preservation of life.69
The state's argument for preserving the individual patient's life is that
withdrawing treatment will "cheapen" the value placed on the concept
of living.7° However, life is not "cheapened" when the decision is
made to withdraw a medical treatment. Life is cheapened when an
individual's right to choose is abridged.7" This interest will rarely
override a patient's right to die when the patient is suffering from an
incurable condition and is near death. 72 The state confers little or no

' See ME sL, supra note 24, § 4.12, at 96.
See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
7 See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 4.12, at 97; see also Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical
Ctr., 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 9 (Ct. C.P. 1980) (stating that "[tihe constitutional right to
privacy is paramount to a state interest unless that interest can be demonstrated to be
compelling or outweighs the individual's constitutional right").
8See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 4.12, at 97.
69 Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 588. This interest really encompasses the preservation of
the individual patient's life and the preservation of all life. See MEISEL, supra note 24,
§ 4.13, at 100.
70 Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
71Id. "The value of life as so perceived is lessened not by the decision to refuse
treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of choice..
• . The constitutional right to privacy ... is an expression of the sanctity of individual
free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life." Id.
72 See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 4.13, at 101; In re Guardianship of Crum, 580
N.E.2d 876 (Ohio 1991) (holding that the state has no interest in the preservation of the
life of an individual inflicted with viral encephalitis who has been in a chronic and
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benefit by briefly extending a patient's life against his or her will.'
Furthermore, the argument concerning the state's interest in
the preservation of all life is less likely to succeed than the argument
concerning the interest in the preservation of the individual's life.
The state's abstract and indirect interest in the preservation of life
will generally give way to the individual's much stronger and
personal "interest in directing the course" of his existence. 74 Cases
that do not involve the state's interest in protecting actual or potential
individuals will generally be decided in the individual's favor75
because it is "grossly unfair to make the sick and the dying bear the
burden of preserving society's devotion to the sanctity of life. 76
The state interest in the prevention of suicide has been
summarily dismissed by most courts. The majority of courts deciding
right-to-die cases do not view the foregoing of treatment as suicide.77
"[T]he underlying State interest in this area lies in the prevention of
irrational self-destruction, '78 not the rational decision of selfdetermination. Suicide commands the individual to specifically intend
to terminate his or her life by some affirmative action. 79 However,
courts generally view the withdrawal of life prolonging measures as
an intent to let nature take its course.80 Furthermore, many courts do

vegetative state for five years). The few cases where this interest has been found to
override an individual's decision have mainly been where permission was sought to
perform blood transfusions. See In re President & Directors of Georgetown College,
Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy
Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971).
1 See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 4.13, at 102.
71In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985).
7S See id.
7'Stephen A. Newman, Euthanasia:Orchestrating"The Last Syllable Of. .. T'Ime,"
53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 153, 174 (1991).
77See, e.g., In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 411 (N.J. 1987). "[Djeclining life
sustaining medical treatment may not properly be viewed as an attempt to commit
suicide." Id. (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224).
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11.
7 See In re Guardianship of Crum, 68 Ohio Misc. 2d 596, 601 (P. Ct. 1991).
So Id.; see In re Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1270 (Mass.), cert. denied
sub nom. Doe v. Gross, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 306 (1986). But compare Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296-97 (Scalia, J., concurring)
If
("Starving oneself to death is no different from putting a gun to one's temple ....
the State may interrupt one mode of self-destruction, it may with equal authority
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not even discuss this interest when deciding such cases. Thus, the
prevention of suicide usually is not thought of as a legitimate state
interest sufficient to override an individual's interest in self
determination.
However, the state's interest in the protection-of third parties,
such as minor children, is more compelling than the interest in the
prevention of suicide." t The state's interest in the welfare of minors
may "justify compulsory medical treatment when necessary to save
the life of the mother of young children or of a pregnant woman."82
However, in most situations, the decision to forego life support is in
the third party's best interest because the medical condition has
already put the parties under an intolerable amount of stress. 3 The
decision is usually made as a family, with the best interests of the
children being paramount.84
The remaining state interest deals with the protection of
medical ethics." This interest is, perhaps, the most justified. The
truly dedicated physician wants only to heal the sick. Some
physicians view removing life support treatment as tantamount to
aiding a suicide, and that therefore, it is against their professional,
moral, and ethical codes.8" However, the modern ethical view does
interfere with the other.").
"' See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 4.15, at 102-03 (stating that protection of third
parties is responsible for more overrulings than any other state interest).
82 A.B. v. C., 477 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (citing In re President &
Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.. 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (ordering
transfusion because of a mother's "responsibility to the community to care for her
infant")). See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 210 A.2d 537
(N.J.) (ordering administration of treatment where there is a substantial chance that the
pregnant patient will live), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); see also Holmes v. Silver
Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (noting that a father can be forced to
undergo a transfusion if his refusal would devastate his dependents).
s See In re Farrell, 529 A.2d at 413.
84 See Delio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 1987)
(holding that the state's interest does not exist when the person who the state seeks to
protect is a proponent of the withdrawal of treatment).
" See, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27 (discussing the state's interest in the
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession).
" See Bartling v. Superior Court. 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984); see also WORLD
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, THE GENEVA OATH (1948), reprintedin GEORGE M. BURNELL,
FINAL CHOICES: To LIVE OR TO DIE IN AN AGE OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 344-45

(1993) (reprinting a new version of the Hippocratic Oath that makes no mention of either

1994]

EUTHANASIA

129

not mandate that all efforts towards maintaining life be made in all
circumstances.7 The American Medical Association recognizes the
need to treat the patient, at all times, with dignity.88 The physician
should decide if life sustaining treatment will outweigh the burden it
imposes.8 9 This state interest, therefore, takes us full circle back to
the benefit-burden test. 90
This two part test approach has been widely used in postQuinlan right-to-die cases.9" The benefit-burden test usually served
as a threshold question to determine the patient's prognosis.' If the
prognosis revealed that the burdens associated with the treatment outweighed the potential benefit, the individual-state interest test was
usually applied to determine if there was any compelling state interest
that could override the interest of the individual.93 If the state's
interest could not override the interests of the individual, the
extraordinary treatment could be withdrawn.'
But, eventually,
individuals and physicians started to question this extraordinary
treatment limitatioh. 9 Thereafter, it was not enough to weigh the
benefits against the burdens and the state's interests against those of
the individual. 96 The treatment itself was also being scrutinized. 97

giving or suggesting the taking of a deadly drug). But compare THE HIPPOCRATIC
OATH, reprinted in BURNELL, supra, at 64-65 ("1 will neither give a deadly drug to
anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect.").
8 See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
MEISEL, supra note 24, § 4.16, at 105 (quoting In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 454
(Wash. 1987) (citing AMA, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND

JUDICIAL AFFAIRS § 2.18, at 13 (1986))).
89 Id.

o See id. § 4.16, at 106.
9' See id. § 4.20, at 109.
IId. § 4.20, at 109-10.

9 See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 4.17, at 107.
See id.
9SSee infra notes 96-117 and accompanying text.
9 See
97Id.

MEiSEL, supra note 24,

§ 4.20, at 109-110.
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3. Extraordinaryv. Ordinary Life-Sustaining Treatment
It is clear that extraordinary means of treatment or life
support systems may be terminated if there is no hope of a cure, and
if this is the wish of the patient and his family.98 Medical ethics not
only permits this decision, but also supports it." It is, however, only
a "myth that only extraordinary treatment may be foregone but that
a patient is obliged to accept ordinary treatment."" Much of the
ordinary medical technology used today was once considered
extraordinary."' Furthermore, what is extraordinary for some
patients, under certain circumstances, may merely be ordinary for the
same patients under different circumstances, or for different patients
under the same circumstances. 0 2 Therefore, "'the terms . . . have
assumed too many conflicting meanings to remain useful,"" ' 3 and
courts will rarely distinguish the two."°4
A competent adult, who has control over his or her own
body, has the right to determine whether or not to surrender to lawful
medical treatment.' 05 This being true, a patient has the right to refuse
medical treatment, which may save or prolong his or her life." ° One

" See In re Storar, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388, 392 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46
(App. Div. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
' See id. at 393.
100Alan Meisel, Legal Myths About Terminating Life Support, 109 ARcHIVEs
INTERNAL MED. 1497, 1499 (1991).

,' See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1235 (N.J. 1985); Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 n.33 (Mass. 1986).
102
See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 4.6, at 86.
I03
Id. at 85 (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1235 (N.J. 1985)). The
Supreme Court has stated that "'there is no reason to suppose that the definition of a
medical term of art should coincide with the parameters of a constitutional standard.'
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 764 n.8 (1985) (quoting Lee v. Winston, 551 F. Supp.
247, 260 (E.D. Va. 1982)).
"o4
See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 4.6, at 83 (citing In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4,
12 n.6 (Fla. 1990)).
1o5See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972).
106See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1986). "People are
entitled to make decisions that others think are foolish as long as their choices are
arrived at through a competently reasoned process and are consistent with their personal
values." Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Decisions Nearthe End ofLife,
267 JAMA 2229, 2230 (1992) [hereinafter Decisions].
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court boldly declared that any patient has the right to refuse any
medical treatment or medical service, even if the exercise of such a
right creates a life threatening condition.107 The distinction between
extraordinary and ordinary treatment is virtually "one without
meaning."'0° The ultimate decision regarding any treatment should
be left to the patient because only he or she will fully understand the
ramifications. But, as in the distinction between types of treatment,
limitations were also being imposed on the type of patients that could
assert the right to refuse treatment. Thus, distinctions were being
made between individual patients that were receiving the same
treatment.
4. Classifications of Patients
In the past few decades, medical science has made great
advances. It is now possible for the medical profession to intervene
and forestall death for most patients. 0 Although these breakthroughs
have worked miracles in certain situations, they also have "prolonged
the slow deterioration and death of some patients. "110 This has most
profoundly affected comatose, incompetent patients who are not free
to explicitly communicate their wishes."' However, the right to
refuse medical treatment has been found to extend to incompetent, as
well as competent, patients because the value of human dignity must
extend to both.'
"Any other view would permit obliteration of an
incompetent's panoply of rights merely because the patient could no
longer sense the violation of those rights."'1
An incompetent

107

Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.

'0

Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 588 (D.R.I. 1988).

'09See Decisions, supra note 106, at 2229.
110
I

In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 406 (N.J. 1987).
See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); In re Eichner, 423

N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1979), modified, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 1980); In re
Quinlan 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
112 See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 427
(Mass. 1977).
"I Norman L. Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying
Patients, 30 RuTGERs L. REv. 243, 252 (1977).
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individual is still an individual in the eyes of the law.
However, competency was not the only factor considered
when determining whether life-prolonging treatment should be
withdrawn. Questions also surfaced about what type of illness (i.e.,
terminal, incurable, etc.) would trigger a right to refuse treatment.
Courts then began to realize that there was no practical reason why
only terminally ill patients were free to exercise this right. 14 "[Tlhe
right to refuse treatment does not need the sanction or approval by
any legislative act, directing how and when it shall be exercised. "115
It is extremely difficult for physicians, let alone the legal community,
to distinguish between life-threatening conditions, terminal illnesses,
and serious illnesses. 1 6 Every competent individual has the right to
determine what treatment his or her body will be subjected to
regardless of his or her illness.' 17 Therefore, the type of illness and
treatment are virtually irrelevant if the burden of such treatment
outweighs the benefits, and the interest of the individual is not
overridden by any compelling state interest." 8 However, prior to
1990, the Supreme Court was silent on an individual's constitutional

...
See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (1986); see also State v.
McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 652 (Ga. 1989) (holding that a quadriplegic had.the right to
disconnect his ventilator even though he was not terminally ill and had a long life
expectancy); Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97-98 (Fla. 1989) (holding
that a Jehovah's Witness can refuse a blood transfusion even though "in all probability"
she would die); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that competent adult patients who have not been diagnosed as terminally ill have
the right to disconnect life-support equipment even though this may hasten death).
"' Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
116 See In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (stating that "[d]istinguishing between serious illnesses is frequently difficult for
physicians and really impossible for the legal community").
.1.
See Schloendorff v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
1,8See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 4.15, at 103. Meisel states:
However most of these overrulings [of the right to die] have
occurred in cases in which the patient's condition is such that he can
probably be returned to status quo ante if treatment is administered,
and consequently the cases really concern the state's interest in
preserving life when it can be meaningfully done.
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right to withdraw any type of life-support." 9
III. The Right to Die and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health
The most heated debate concerning the right-to-die issue has
been over whether to allow the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
hydration. Some saw this as causing the patients' deaths by "creating
the malnutrition by virtue of which [the patients] die." 2° These
critics contend that artificial nutrition and hydration is not a medical
treatment at all, and that termination results in a patient's starving to
death and constitutes active euthanasia. ' Although some do assign
an "emotional symbolism" to artificial feeding, there really is "no
legal difference between a mechanical device that allows a person to
breathe artificially and a mechanical device that artificially allows a
person nourishment." 22 The majority of appellate courts that have
decided this issue have held that artificial nutrition and hydration are
medical procedures that may be foregone just like any other forms of
life support.' These conflicting views finally gave the Supreme
Court the proper opportunity to voice its opinion on the "right-to-die"
issue.
A. The United States Supreme Court's
Recognition of the Right to Die
In 1990, the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of
"whether the United States Constitution grants what is in common

"9 See In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 958,
(1988); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981);
In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Raleigh FitkinPaul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 210 A.2d 537 (Md.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
985 (1964).
120 Clouser, supra note 10, at 307.
121See

MEISEL, supra note 24, § 5.10, at 129.

122Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587 (D.R.I. 1988).
123

Id.
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parlance referred to as a 'right to die,""' 24 by deciding Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health. Nancy Cruzan, had
sustained severe injuries in an automobile accident."z She was
incompetent and lying in a persistent vegetative state 2 6 in a Missouri
state hospital when her case was reviewed by the Supreme Court.127
Nancy's parents sought the termination of artificial nutrition and
hydration after it became apparent that Nancy had virtually no chance
Although hospital
of ever regaining her mental faculties.' 28
employees refused to honor Nancy's parents' wishes, the state trial
court authorized the termination of artificial nutrition and hydration,•
finding that "a person in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right
under the State and Federal Constitution to refuse or direct the
withdrawal of 'death prolonging procedures."" 29 The trial court also
relied on Nancy's previous conversations with friends and family
which expressed her wish not to delay the inevitable by such medical
procedures. 130
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although
there is a recognized right to refuse unwanted treatment under the
doctrine of informed consent, such a right is not found in every
circumstance,' 3 ' and expressed skepticism about the application of
that doctrine in the circumstances of this case. 132 The court found
Nancy's previous statements "unreliable for the purpose of

124Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).

By

analyzing certain cases representative of the right-to-die issue, the Supreme Court found
that these cases illustrated similarities, but also demonstrated diversity in "their
approaches to decision[s] of what all agree is a perplexing question with unusually strong
moral and ethical overtones." Id.
22 Id. at 261.
" An individual in a persistent vegetative state has neither self-awareness nor
awareness of the surroundings. See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987). The
body is "functioning entirely in terms of its internal controls;" maintaining heart beat,
temperature, pulmonary ventilation, digestive, and reflex activity. Id.
227 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266 & n.1.
I2 Id. at 267.
229 Id. at 268.
130 Id.
3 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988) (en bane), aff'd sub nom.

Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
132Id. at 418B
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determining her intent."' Furthermore, Nancy's parents could not
exercise substitute judgment on Nancy's behalf because the
formalities required under Missouri's Living Will statutes were not
present, and there 4was no clear and convincing evidence illustrating
Nancy's wishes.

3

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and, in a five-to-four
decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld "[tihe principle
that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment. "I's The Court found
that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment was best analyzed
as a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 6 In
finding such a right, the Court relied on prior decisions that balanced
the state's interests against the individual's interests.'

However,

IId. at 424.
134Id.

at 425.

115Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. The majority also assumed that a competent person has
a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition, and thus
implicitly held that this type of "treatment" was no different then other forms of lifesustaining treatment. See id. at 279. Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, stated
the premise explicitly by declaring: "Artificial feeding cannot readily be distinguished
from other forms of medical treatment." Id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMA, AMA ETHICAL OPINION 2.20,
WrrHHOLDING OR WrrHDRAWING LIFE PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT, CURRENT
OPINIONS 13 (1989)). The remaining issue, one to which the majority was dedicated,
was whether an incompetent patient possesses these same rights and, if so, by what
standard must it be proven. Id. at 279. One Justice of the majority found no basis for
such rights in the Constitution, and would have rather left the decision to the states. Id.
at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia wrote:
[Mrhe point at which life becomes 'worthless' and the point at which
the means necessary to preserve it become 'extraordinary' or
'inappropriate,' are neither set forth in the Constitution nor known
to the nine Justices of this Court any better than they are known to
nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone
directory ....

Id.
"
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7. The court believed that the right-to-die issue is
more properly analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest, and not under
a "generalized constitutional right to privacy." Id.
117Id. at 278-79. These prior decisions encompassed individuals declining unwanted

smallpox vaccines, Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905), prisoners avoiding
unwanted antipsychotic drugs, Wash. v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990), as well
as children being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment, Parham v. J.R., 442
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finding a constitutionally protected liberty interest was not enough.
In order to determine if Missouri violated this right, the Court had to
balance Nancy Cruzan's interests against those interests relevant to
the State.
B. Individual Interests v. State Interests
1. The Individual's Interest Under Cruzan
The majority in Cruzan found that the State's interest in the
preservation of life outweighed any interests Nancy Cruzan had. 39
The majority, however, never discussed any of the individual's
interests common in right-to-die cases, such as autonomy, selfdetermination, privacy, and bodily integrity." 4 It merely discussed
the State's interest in the preservation of life, and held that this
interest could only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 4 '
In so doing, the Supreme Court and Missouri "discarded evidence of
[Nancy Cruzan's] will, ignored her values, and deprived her of the
right to a decision as closely approximating her own choice as
humanly possible."142
Although the majority did not find an individual's interest
important enough to discuss, two of the dissenters, Justices Brennan
and Stevens, relied on such interests. 143 Justice Brennan defined a
U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
" Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321
(1982)).
,s9
Id. at 280-82.

"~See MmSEL, supra note 24, § 4.12, at 96 (stating that the individual interests at
stake are autonomy, self determination, privacy and bodily integrity).
141Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion touches on the
subject, but her opinion does not fully address perhaps the most important aspects of this
case: Nancy Cruzan's interests and what was best for her. Id. at 288-90 (O'Connor,
J.,concurring).
142Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I believe that.Nancy Cruzan has a
fundamental right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and hydration, which right
is not outweighed by any interests of the State ...." (emphasis added)); see also id. at
331 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In my view, the Constitution requires the State to care for
Nancy Cruzan's life in a way that gives appropriate respect to her own best interests.").

1994]

EUTHANASIA

137

right to withdraw artificial hydration and nutrition as the "right to
evaluate the potential benefit of treatment and its possible
consequences according to one's own values and to make a personal
decision whether to subject oneself to the intrusion. '"" For many,
what is important is a "proud death" with "bodily integrity intact;"
not "an ignoble end, steeped in decay." 145 Justice Brennan believed
that the Constitution required that Nancy Cruzan's best interests be
afforded the appropriate respect. 146 However, Justice Brennan
concluded that "the147 State Supreme Court largely ignored" Nancy
Cruzan's interests.
The individual's interest in dignity, how one will be
remembered, and the effect on his or her family were perceived by
two of the dissenters as being very important. Justice Brennan found
a tremendous amount of humility and sorrow attached to the constant
vigil undertaken by the incompetent's family., 4 People want to be
remembered as they were before their illness or accident, and it is
very disturbing when the lasting impression is when they were in a
persistent vegetative state.' 49 Justice Stevens believed that Nancy
Cruzan's interests included how she would be remembered after her
death by those people that mattered most to her. 5° Unfortunately,
these people will remember her death more than her life.
2. The State's Interest Under Cruzan
The only state interest asserted in Cruzan was the interest in

'"Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
1 Id. at 310-11.
'"Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 331.
147 Id. at 334.
" Id. at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Such conditions are, for many, humiliating
to contemplate as is visiting a prolonged and anguished vigil on one's parents, spouse,
and children.").
141Id. at 353 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Insofar as Nancy Cruzan has an interest in
being remembered for how she lived rather than how she died, the damage done to those
memories by the prolongation of her death is irreversible.").
130
See id. at 344 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 329 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("In these unfortunate situations, the bodies and preferences and memories
of the victims do not escheat to the State.").
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the protection and preservation of human life."' The majority
reasoned that "the choice between life and death is a deeply personal
decision of obvious and overwhelming finality," and that States are
"entitled to guard against potential abuses in such situations."' 52
There will be times when the best interest of the patient will not be
looked after, and "there is no automatic assurance that the view of
close family members will necessarily be the same as the patient's
would have been." 53
' The Court held that an incompetent individual
does have a conditional right to refuse lifesaving treatment, but only
if clear and convincing evidence is shown.'5 In accordance with the
Court's decision, under Missouri Law, the decision of the individual
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. 55 Therefore, this
procedural requirement is not forbidden by the Constitution.' 56
The State's interest in the preservation of life allows it to
impose heightened requirements so that dangers associated with the
individual's right will be minimized. 57 The Court arrived at this
decision by concluding that any "erroneous decision not to terminate
[artificial nutrition and hydration] results in a maintenance of the
status quo." 58 Any wrong decision may potentially be "corrected or
its impact mitigated." 15 9 However, "from the point of view of the
patient, an erroneous decision in either direction is irrevocable."'"

'' Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. When reviewing other previously identified state
interests, such as the prevention of suicide and homicide, protection of interests of
innocent third parties, maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and
preservation of life, the Missouri Supreme Court found that "only the state's interest in
the preservation of life is implicated." Id. at 313 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988)).
152Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
'53Id. at 286.
154Id.

at 279-80.

"I Id. at 280. "Missouri requires that evidence of the incompetent's wishes as to the
withdrawal of treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence." Id.
156Id.
157Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281-83.
15d I.
at 283.
159 Id. (finding that the wrong decision may potentially be corrected by the possibility
of new developments in medical science, the discovery of new evidence regarding the
patient's intent, or the unexpected death of the patient while receiving the life support
treatment).
I0 Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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By erroneously deciding not to withdraw life support, the patient is
robbed of the very interests the right was established to protect: the
right against degradation, the right not to prolong his or her family's
suffering, and the right to be remembered for who that individual
was, not what he or she has become. 1 ' The majority's "maintenance
of the status quo" is, unfortunately, only consistent with the State's
interest, not the interest of Nancy Cruzan.' 62
Furthermore, in discussing the state's interest in the
preservation of life, the Court attacked the judicial proceedings aimed
at determining the incompetent's wishes regarding the continuation of
life support.'63 These judicial proceedings may not be adversarial,
especially in situations where all the parties agree that termination of
life support is in the best interest of the patient.
Even though
everyone may be acting in good faith, the consideration of the
proceedings is "meant to illustrate the limits which may obtain on the
adversarial nature of this type of litigation. @165 However, as Justice
Brennan's dissent maintains, if everyone agrees, the process has not
failed, and there was merely no dispute as to Nancy's preference."
The Court also believed that a state may decline, if it so
chooses, to make "[value] judgments about the 'quality' of life that
a particular individual may enjoy," and merely assert an "unqualified
interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the
constitutionally protected interests of the individual. '167 However, a
state's constitutional attack must be based on a legitimate state

161 Id.

162Cruzan,
163 Id.

497 U.S. at 353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

at 281.
I" "In such a case, a guardian may act in entirely good faith, and yet not maintain
a position truly adversarial to that of the family." Id. at 281 n.9. In Cruzan, the family
members, friends, doctors, and even the guardian ad litem all agreed that termination
of the artificial nutrition and hydration was what Nancy would have wanted, and that it
was in her best interest. Id. at 318-19 (Bennan, J., dissenting). However, the guardian
ad litem believed an appeal should be made, not because it was in the best interest of
Nancy, but because of the responsibility to pursue the matter fully. Id. at 281 n.9.
" Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 n.9.
id. at 319 (Brennan, ., dissenting).
I
'67Id. at 282.
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concern, other than a mere disagreement with the individual choice.168
Anything else would render the liberty interest, protected by the Due
Process Clause, a "nullity."' 69 It was hard to tell if the State was
merely disagreeing with Nancy's choice, or if it was just trying to
fully ascertain what that choice was by "clear and convincing"
evidence.
C. The "Clear and Convincing" Evidence Standard
The clear and convincing evidence standard 7 ° has been
warranted "when the individual interests at stake in a state 'proceeding
are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss
This standard ordinarily acts as a "shield" for the
of money.'"''
individual, rather than a "sword," because it usually acts to protect
the individual.' 72 Here, ironically, the clear and convincing standard
acts as the sword, keeping the body alive, instead of being the shield
that lays the individual to rest.
Under Missouri law, the incompetent patient must show by
clear and convincing evidence that she would choose to disconnect
the life support, if she were competent. '71 However, when deciding
whether the burden is satisfied, the Court only looks at evidence of
specific statements of treatment choice made by the patient, when he
or she was competent, in order to support a finding that the patient,
now in a persistent vegetative state, would wish to avoid further

"a Id. at 313-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hodgson v. Minn., 497 U.S. 417,
435 (1990)).
169Id.
170"The clear and convincing standard of proof has been variously defined in this
context as 'proof sufficient to persuade the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and
settled commitment to the termination of life supports under the circumstances like those
' Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 285 n.l1 (quoting In re Westchester County
presented ....
Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988)).
171Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Tex., 441
U.S. 418, 424 (1979)).
172 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989) (plurality opinion).
1 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
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medical treatment. 74 According to the Court, only those explicitly
expressed wishes of the individual, regarding treatment choices
17
should they become incompetent, will be given any weight at all.
In Cruzan, the petitioners urged the Missouri court to accept
the "substituted judgment" of close family members.1 76
The
substituted judgment standard requires that a surrogate attempt to
reach the decision that the incapacitated person would make if he or
she were able to choose.177 This standard can only be used if the
patient was once able to express his or her wishes, and reliable
evidence concerning these wishes is required.17
The Court,
however, rejected this standard, and concluded that the State may rely
only on the incompetent's wishes that have been proven by clear and
convincing evidence.' 79
However, under. Cruzan, the only evidence that could be
proven by clear and convincing evidence are prior statements made
by a competent individual concerning the specific life support
treatment being employed.' ° The Supreme Court found that the
Missouri Supreme Court did not commit error by holding that there
was not clear and convincing evidence that Nancy wished to have the
artificial hydration and nutrition withdrawn."' It, therefore, appears
that an individual, with no advance directive, would be unable to
discontinue a specific medical treatment, unless he or she specifically
stated while competent that it should be disconnected if the situation

'74 Id. at 316 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the majority seemed to weigh
the option of forbidding oral testimony to determine the wishes of the patient; comparing
this terrible situation to contract disputes and will contests. See id at 284. Fortunately,

the holding of this case does not seem to reach that far.
"I Id. at 286-87.
176 Id. at 285-86.
177See PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN

MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To FOREGO LIFESUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES

IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 132 (1983).
I78Id. at 133.
Iso

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286-87.
See id. at 285. "The [trial testimony] did not deal in terms with withdrawal of.

hydration and nutrition." Id.
181 Id.
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1
ever arose.
This view also fails to consider the protection of children and
mentally incompetent individuals who never had the opportunity to
express their desires. These individuals were never capable of
forming "value preferences which treatment/nontreatment decisions
require." ' 3 Under Cruzan, such individuals will have to be kept
alive for years, maybe decades, because they never had the ability to
state: "Let me go." In such situations, knowledge of what the
individual would choose to do is not as important because the
individual never had the capacity to choose. Instead, knowledge of
the individual's feelings and perceptions of events becomes paramount
Only family and
when exercising the right to decline treatment.'
friends who have had contact with the never-competent individual
understand his or her wishes. However, under the clear and
convincing evidence standard, these wishes could never be recognized
and the individual would have to put his or her faith in the hands of
the state legislature instead of where it properly belongs-in the hands
of his or her family.' 85
Justices Brennan and Stevens agreed with the majority that the
individual's choice, if he or she ever had the ability to choose, should
be proven with indisputable accuracy.' 86 According to Justice
must be [the] touchstone,"' 87 and the critical
Brennan, "accuracy . . ..
question, according to Justice Stevens, is "not how to prove the
controlling facts but rather what proven facts should be

192

dissenting) ("An innocent person's constitutional right
id. at 338-39 (Stevens, J.,

to be free from unwanted medical treatment is thereby categorically limited to those

patients who had the foresight to make an unambiguous statement of their wishes while
competent."). Furthermore, it appears that even if the individual had an advanced

directive, the specific treatment may not properly be withdrawn if it is not specifically
dissenting). "Too few people
at 323 (Brennan, J.,
mentioned in the document. See id.
execute living wills or equivalently formal directives for such an evidentiary rule to
ensure adequately that the wishes of incompetent persons will be honored." Id.
Missouri's living will statute specifically provided that the absence of a living will was
at 324.
not a presumption that an individual wanted life support continued. See id.
183 See Newman, supra note 59, at 48.
I84 See id.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 350 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
" Id. at 316 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.
Id. at 316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
IS7
ISS See
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When the proven facts clearly show that an
controlling.""'
individual,
with virtually no chance of recovery, would
incompetent
choose to discontinue life support, the best interest of the individual
has been accurately demonstrated, and no general state policy should
prevail. 8 9 However, under the majority opinion, such a finding is
not clear and convincing, because the state is more concerned about
other people, instead of the individual who is in need.' tg

Unfortunately, under Cruzan, the state ignores those actively
struggling, and makes its commitment in the abstract."19

Under the clear and convincing standard, unless there are
express wishes from the individual, the state's interest in the
preservation of life will win out over conclusive evidence presented
by family, friends, and doctors. 92 The burden of avoiding an
erroneous decision is thus on those seeking to terminate the life
support treatment, which presumably reflects the seriousness of the
proceeding.' 93 This seems to suggest that the state is in a better
position to determine what the individual's best interests are."

However," [flamily members have a unique knowledge of the patient
which is vital to any decision on his or her behalf."'9 "

Nancy

"sId. at 350 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
189Id.

'90Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 350. "A State that seeks to demonstrate its commitment to
life may do so by aiding those actively struggling for life and health." Id. at 357
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
"' See id. at 356-57 (Stevens, J.,dissenting). Nancy Cruzan was ultimately granted
the right to die. Several months after the Supreme Court decision, new evidence was
discovered and judicial permission was granted to withdraw the life support. This time,
the State of Missouri did not oppose the Cruzan's family request. See Andrew H.
Malcolm, Missouri Family Renews Battle Over Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1990,
at A14. Nancy Cruzan died 11 days after judicial permission was granted to discontinue
the tube feeding and almost eight years after her quest for self-determination began. See
ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE, at xii (Supp. 1994).
'9 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282-83.
19 See John N. Suhr, Jr., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health: A
Clear and Convincing Call for Comprehensive Legislation to Protect Incompetent
Patients'Rights,40 Am. U. L. REV. 1477, 1505 (1991).
'94 See id. at 1505-06.

191
Newman, supra note 59, at 46. The individual's family will know the
incompetent's "life style, values, medical attitudes, and general world view." Id. In
nearly all situations, the personal knowledge possessed by one's family, regarding an
incompetent individual, will be much deeper and more insightful than hospital staff,
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Cruzan's family and friends knew her views and testified at trial.1 96
The State, however, was a stranger to Nancy, 97 and had no way of
knowing what her interests were.' 98 Therefore, this extremely
personal decision should have been left to Nancy's family, absent
clear and convincing evidence that removing the treatment would not
have been in her best interest.' 99

D. The Right to Die After Cruzan
The Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan did not limit the
constitutional right to die. 2" The Court merely determined that when
a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration from a
incompetent individual, a state may apply a clear and convincing
evidence standard in such proceedings. 20 ' This does not "prevent
other states from applying a lower standard of proof to determine a
patient's intent or merely deferring to the decisions of close family

attending physicians, guardians ad litem, judges and, most importantly, the State. Id.
at 47.
"9The evidence presented at trial showing Nancy's interests included the testimony
of a long-time friend, co-worker and housemate, who, after recalling a conversation the
two had, testified that "Nancy ...would never want to live [in a vegetative state]"
because "she didn't want to live that way .... she wanted to be able to live, not to just
lay in bed and not be able to move because you can't do anything for yourself."
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 321-22 n.19. This friend also stated that Nancy said she hoped all
of her family knew that she didn't want to live in a vegetative state because she thought
it would be up to them. Id. at 322. Other evidence adduced at trial included testimony
from Nancy's sister-describing two very serious conversations on the subject-Nancy's
mother, and another friend. Id. at 322 n. 19. The Missouri Supreme Court dismissed
Nancy's statements to the long time friend as "'unreliable' on the ground that it was an
informally expressed reaction to other people's medical condition." Id. at 322 n.19
(citing Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424). The Missouri Supreme Court never referred to any
other evidence or why it was rejected. Id.
9 See id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
i See id.
I See Suhr, supra note 193, at 1517.
See id. at 1512.
o1,
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284.

2
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members. ,,2 2 Because there is no national consensus on this sensitive
20 3
problem, the decision, therefore, rests with the individual states.
Later cases have made it clear that Cruzan does not mandate
the use of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard when
deciding "right to withdraw treatment" cases.2 Some courts have
held that cases involving important personal rights will not be
governed by the "clear and convincing" standard or the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard. 25 Rather, "the seriousness of the
decision will be more forcefully impressed on judges if they are
required to set forth findings in 'meticulous detail' than if they
merely label their findings as meeting a particular standard." 2"
Furthermore, the courts that have retained the clear and
convincing standard have not applied it in such a rigid fashion, as
applied by the Supreme Court in Cruzan. For example, in DeGrella
v. Elston,20 7 the facts were extremely analogous to those in Cruzan.208
However, Martha Sue DeGrella received her wish while Nancy

20 Suhr, supra note 193, at 1512; see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring) (stating that this decision "does not preclude a future determination that the
Constitution requires the States to implement the decisions of a patient's duly appointed
surrogate. Nor does it prevent States from developing other approaches for protecting
an incompetent individual's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.").
See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See In re Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1272 n.19 (Mass.), cert. denied sub nom. Doe
v. Gross, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992). While some cases have used the clear and convincing
standard (see, e.g., Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 753 (Md. 1993)), some have not
(see, e.g., Doe, 583 N.E.2d at 1271 (employing a "'preponderance of the evidence'
[standard] with an 'extra measure of evidentiary protection' [by reason of] specific
findings of fact after a 'careful review of the evidence."')).
20SSee, e.g., Doe, 583 N.E.2d at 1271.
Id, at 1271 (quoting Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d. 836, 844 (Mass. 1978)).
0 858 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1993).
2 In DeGrella. the individual at issue was an incompetent patient in a persistent
vegetative state with no chance of recovery. Id. at 700-01. She was being kept alive
through the use of a gastrostomy tube implanted into her stomach so that she could
receive nutrition and hydration. Id. at 700. No advance directive was executed and the
individual did not specifically state, when she was competent, that she desired the
removal of artificial nutrition and hydration, if such a need ever existed. Id. at 703.
She did state, as did Nancy Cruzan, that she did not want to be kept alive by artificial
means. id. at 702.
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Cruzan did not. 09 Martha's wish was granted because the court
recognized "it would be unreasonable to require such a high degree
of specificity on her part" to state that she did not want artificial
nutrition and hydration administered.210 The court found that the
statements made to family and friends before her incompetency
constituted "competent evidence upon which a surrogate decisionmaker could exercise substitute judgment in the circumstances
presented." 211 Therefore, statements made regarding life threatening
situations will sometimes, depending on the court, be accepted as
competent evidence of an individual's wishes.
Not all cases after Cruzan involved the withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration.

McKay v. Bergstedt,21 2 decided a few

months after Cruzan, involved a mentally competent quadriplegic,
who sought a court order permitting the removal of his respirator. 2 3
While originally presented as a Cruzan "right-to-die" case, one
distinguishing factor made this a case of first impression. Kenneth
Bergstedt, the individual seeking court permission to terminate life
prolonging treatment, sought to have a sedative administered when
his respirator was disconnected, thereby relieving any pain
accompanying his demise.21 4 In deciding Kenneth's plight, the
Nevada Supreme Court added a fifth state interest after discussing the

Nancy Cruzan ultimately was granted the right to die, but not by the United States
Supreme Court. See supra note 191. The opinion in Cruzan seems to suggest that if
Martha DeGrella's case was before the Court, Martha's wish would not have been
granted either because she did not expressly state that artificial nutrition and hydration
should be discontinued if the situation ever presented itself.
210 DeGrella, 858 S.W.2d at 703.
211Id. According to the DeGrella court, Martha Sue DeGrella:
[Riepeatedly expressed the view that she would not want to be kept
alive by artificial means. She found the plight of Karen Ann
Quinlan and Quinlan's continued treatment to be abhorrent to her.
She hated any limitations on her abilities and she feared being
reduced to being dependent on others. She went so far as to protest
being put on a respirator after her second automobile accident, even
though no question ever existed that she would recover.
Id. at 702-03 (quoting the trial court's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, Sept. 3, 1992) (footnote omitted).
212801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
213Id. at 620.
214 Id. at 620.
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four traditional state interests.215 This fifth interest involves the
State's ability to "encourag[e] the charitable and humane care of those
lives [that] may be artificially extended under conditions which have
216
the prospect of providing at least a modicum of quality living.@
This state interest seeks to encourage humane care and treatment for
all citizens stricken with disabilities.21 7 Its underlying purpose is to
enhance the quality of life of these individuals so that they can more
fully enjoy their lives, no matter how limited.218
However, when no compelling state interest exists to
countervail the removal of life support, the court must recognize that
"a patient's 'right to be free from pain at the time the ventilator [or
other life support system] is disconnected is inseparable from his right
to refuse medical treatment.' "29 The Bergstedt court immunized any

physician, who assisted the patient or administered medication to
minimize pain, from any civil or criminal liability.22° The Bergstedt
court has, therefore, gone a step further than the Cruzan Court, and
seems to be condoning physicians actively assisting their patient's
death. Unfortunately, the Nevada Supreme Court granted Kenneth's
wish after he had passed away.22
IV. Is it Really a Big Step From the Right to Die to
the Right to Obtain Assistance to Die?
The Bergstedt case suggests that this country is moving
towards legalizing assisted suicide or voluntary active euthanasia.
The natural progression of this body of law seems to show that this
is precisely the direction in which we are going.222 Twenty years
215The four traditional state interests are: (1) preserving the sanctity of life; (2)

preventing suicide; (3) protecting third parties; and (4) preserving the integrity of the
medical profession. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
211 McKay, 801 P.2d at 621.
217 Id. at 628.
218

Id.

219

Id. at 631 (quoting State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 652 (Ga. 1989)).

IId. The dissent argued that this case was nothing less than a homicide, and that
it decreed the legality of assisted suicide. Id. at 633 (Springer, J., dissenting).
22'Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 619 n.1.
22 See generally supra part II (analyzing the right-to-die background).
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ago, doctors, lawyers, and ethicists were debating whether to merely
withhold life support treatment. Then the Quinlan decision shifted
the debate to withholding versus withdrawing extraordinary life
support. The debate subsequently changed again, focusing on the
withdrawal of extraordinary life support versus ordinary life support.
It then refocused on the rights of incompetent patients versus
competent patients, and then finally on the rights of terminally ill
patients versus non-terminally ill patients with incurable disease.
Twenty years later, the "right-to-die" issue continues to evolve.
A. Are Assisted Suicide and Active Euthanasia
Proper Terms?
Before going further, we should ask whether a terminally or
incurably ill person's decision to end his or her pain and suffering is
properly categorized as "suicide." Suicide has been defined as "the
deliberate termination of one's own life."223 However, suicide is
currently viewed as the "act of a mentally ill, sick, and depressed
People like
individual, who require[s] medical treatment." 2
2
5
226
Diane, Louise, and countless others should not be insulted or
1000 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991).
T. CeloCruz, Aid-in-Dying: Should We Decriminalize Physician-Assisted

223BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
2,4 Maria

Suicide and Physician-CommittedEuthanasia?, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 369, 375 (1992).
This was a primary reason why suicide is no longer considered a criminal offense. See
T. Patrick Hill, The Right to Die: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 85 S. 'MED. J.55,
55 (1992). However, most states have prohibitions against assisted suicide. See John
A. Alesandro, Suicide and New York Law, 57 ALB. L. REv. 819, 858 (1994).
Oregon has recently passed legislation, known as Measure 16, that will allow
doctors to hasten death for terminally ill individuals. See The 1994 Elections: Ballot
Issues; Voters in Oregon Allow Doctors to Help the Terminally Ill Die, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 11, 1994, at A28. However, on December 27, 1994, a federal judge issued a
preliminary injunction so that legal arguments could be made on the issue. See Paul
Leavitt, Assisted Suicide Law on Hold in Oregon, USA TODAY, Dec. 28, 1994, at 3A.
I Diane was the patient Dr. Timothy E. Quill helped "over the edge into death in
the face of such severe suffering." See Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity-A Case
of Individualized Decision Making (Sounding Board), 324 NEw ENO. J. MED. 69i, 694
(1991). Timothy Quill's description of Diane does not paint a picture of a mentally ill,
depressed person in need of treatment. In fact, Diane was a strong willed, independent
person who overcame much adversity. Id. She merely wanted to maintain her dignity,
and die peacefully. Id.
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belittled by classifying their deaths as a suicide. They were strong
willed, proud people who dearly wanted to live, but were unable to
do so in the manner in which they were accustomed. This is not
suicide, this is self-determination at its final stage. For these reasons,
"suicide" is an unjust label pinned upon those! courageous individuals
who have endured so much suffering. Therefore, the term "assisted
suicide" will no, longer be used in this Note when referring to a
patient's right to receive assistance in dying.
Similarly, active euthanasia is not a proper term to use when
discussing an individual's desire for peace and serenity. Euthanasia
is a term synonymous with Nazi death camps, and the extermination
of specific groups of people.227 Hitler's maddening programs
Hitler also,
ultimately sought the purification of the Volk. 2"'
however, sought to free national resources that were being "wasted"
on the State's mental and physical dependents.229 Contrary to today's
society, *the Nazi regime's determination of whose life was worth
living was made by physicians, not the individual. 2 ' These were acts
of murder perpetrated on helpless victims without their consent or
knowledge.2 t Today, the "right to die with assistance" movement is
grounded in individual choice,- and has no resemblance, whatsoever,
to the Nazi euthanasia programs of the not too distant past.
Active euthanasia is also often referred to as "mercy
killing. ,232 The term "mercy killing" generally refers to methods of
shooting or strangulation, which have never been methods employed

226 Louise

(not her real name) was a patient with an unidentified disease, who

terminated her pain and suffering with the assistance of Compassion in Dying (an
organization that helps terminally ill people end their lives). See Lisa Belkin, There's
No Simple Suicide, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 14, 1993, at 51. Louise was lucid and
competent at the time of her death, Id. She wanted to avoid the debilitating effects of
her terminal illness, which included the eventual disintegration of her brain. Id.
27 See BURNELL. supra note 86, at 247-48.
Volk is German for "people." Hitler's ultimate goal was to create a "pure" Volk.
See Mary M. Penrose, Assisted Suicide: A Tough Pill to Swallow, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 689
(1993).
See id.
° See id.
23 See BURNELL, supra note 86, at 248.
132Id. at 248.
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by today's euthanasia practitioners.233 Although euthanasia
practitioners are driven by mercy, they do not deserve to be thrown
in the same category as depraved murderers or ruthless thugs.
Therefore, as with suicide, the term euthanasia will not be used
hereinafter because of its connotations to Nazi death camps and
mercy killings. The psychological effects of using "suicide" or
"euthanasia" make it nearly impossible to erase the negative images
so as to properly see the positive aspects.
The right to self-determination has been defined as "an
individual's 'strong . . . personal interest in directing the course of

his own life, an individual's right to behave and act as he deems
2 4
An individual's interest in directing his own death should be
fit.""'

Therefore, the term defining a physician's
just as personal.
assistance, in either prescribing drugs to bring about a consenting
patient's death or affirmatively performing the act that brings about
that patient's death, will hereinafter be referred to as "assisted selfdetermination."235 While this is merely a linguistical alteration, the
term more properly respects all the parties involved.
Assisted self-determination would encompass a dying patient's
general right to receive a physician's assistance in order to end his or
her pain and suffering. This right is not limited to receiving a
physician's aid in merely obtaining potentially deadly medication.23 6
It includes a patient's right to have the affirmative assistance of the
physician (or other third party), who performs the act which brings
about death. 237 To have one without the other would deprive
hopelessly ill patients of a right that others have merely because they

233Id.
2 In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 453 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., concurring) (quoting
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223. 1228 (N.J. 1985)).
23 The term "assisted self-determination," therefore, encompasses the meaning of

both assisted suicide and active euthanasia. For definitions of these two terms, see
Cheryl K. Smith, What About Legalized Assisted Suicide, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 503, 504
(1993). See MEISEL, supra note 24, §§ 3.9, 3.10, at 62-66 (defining assisted suicide and
active euthanasia).
' This is generally considered Assisted Suicide. See Smith, supra note 235, at 504.
237This affirmative assistance is what distinguishes active euthanasia from assisted
suicide. See id.
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have reached the point where they can not act for themselves. 38
Therefore, assisted self-determination does not distinguish between
patients. It treats them equally and with compassion.

B. The Right to Assisted Self-Determination
is Not Absolute
Just as the right to withdraw life sustaining medical treatment
is not absolute,239 the right to receive life ending medical treatment
is also not absolute.24 ° Such a right would depend on the condition

of the patient, the illness, and the same competing state interests
highlighted in the right-to-die cases.2 41 After all, the right to die and
the right to assisted self-determination are extremely analogous. In
both situations, an individual ultimately wants his or her suffering
ended, and to be rid of a seemingly endless burden. However, there
must be safeguards to protect against abuse.
Voluntariness is the most important requirement that must be
present when deciding whether a right to assisted self-determination
exists. 42 As in committing suicide, a terminally ill patient's rational
decision to obtain assisted self-determination must be "an exercise of
free will." 43 If such a decision is not based on free will, the patient
does not make an informed choice about the type of treatment
desired. This would amount to no more than involuntary euthanasia,
which is contrary to the very idea of assisted self-determination.
Therefore, an individual's choice would have to "entailfl an

8 An example of this would be two patients with Lou Gehrig's disease. For a
description of the symptoms of this dreaded disease, see supra text accompanying notes
2-5. If one patient has unfortunately progressed to the point of paralyzation, he or she
will not have the means of performing the final act, while the other patient, who is just
as terminal, has "fortunately" not reached the point of total dependence, and thus may
perform the final act. See Scenario 1 & 2, supra pp. 115-16.
239See Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 & n.5 (1984).
240 See CeloCruz, supra note 224, at 386-88.
241See discussion supra part II.B.2.
242 See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 2.16, at 30 (arguing that "a patient's permission
is not legally effective unless it is voluntary").
243See Steven J. Wolhandler, Voluntary Active Euthanasiafor the Terminally Ill and
the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 363, 366-67 (1984).
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opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the
risks attendant upon each." 2 "
To determine whether this decision was voluntarily made
would seem to require that the patient be competent so as to be able
to make the informed choice.24 An individual that was in an accident
and has subsequently lapsed into a persistent vegetative state would
not be able to arrive at an informed decision, and presumably would
not have planned for such a situation in a living will or other
advanced directive.246 However, this would seem to preclude an
individual whose disease renders her incompetent before she takes the
final steps that will end her misery.247 Assisted self-determination
could be an answer for them if their wishes were known. However,
the severity of the action would warrant a clear and convincing
standard.248 Unlike Cruzan,249 where only passive steps were to be
taken, the "clear and convincing" standard is warranted here because
of the active steps to be taken and the severity of the treatment.
Therefore, only competent individuals who can give their informed
decision will generally be able to assert this right, although an
incompetent individual who was prepared to assert this right but was
ultimately unable to, will be given the chance if such wishes can be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.
A further limitation on the right to assisted self-determination
would be the severity of the illness and the stage to which it has
progressed. Although, the right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
244

id. at 366 n. 15. This passage refers to the informed consent doctrine, discussed

supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
245See Julie A. DiCamillo, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Die in the
Netherlands and the United States After Cruzan: Reassessing the Right of Self
Determination, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 807, 821-22 (1990).
246 Living wills generally govern situations dealing with withholding or withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment in the event the individual is rendered incompetent. See
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991). As of today, living wills do
not encompass assisted suicide or active euthanasia treatment because such treatment is
currently illegal. See Leslie Laurence, PhysiciansPonderDealing with PatientChoosing
Death, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 22, 1993, at 2.
247See MEISEL, supra note 24, § 1.3, at 6.
"[Mjany patients are not able to
participate in decisionmaking for the very reason that a decision needs to be made-that
is, because they are incapacitated by the severity of their illness." Id.
24 See discussion supra part III.C. (analyzing the clear and convincing standard).
249497 U.S. at 273.
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exists for terminal and non-terminal patients,25 the right to assisted
self-determination, unfortunately, cannot be so broad. This right can
only exist for patients who are terminally or incurably ill, and who
are in advanced stages of their illnesses as determined by an
independent physician.2 51 This limitation protects against abuses,
including coercion, undue influence, and fraud. For example, there
may be "some unfortunate situations in which family members will
not act to protect a patient.""' By limiting the individuals eligible to
exercise this option to terminally or incurably ill patients in advanced
stages of their illnesses, these abuses will be protected. Furthermore,
this serves to protect patients who have treatable illnesses, such as
depression. 253 For most of those patients that are not in the final
stages of life, but are incurably ill and in pain, there is a built-in
safeguard available to them. Most incurably ill patients who are
suffering a great deal are presumably on some type of life-support
apparatus. They can merely direct its removal. 2"
The remaining limitations on the right to assisted selfdetermination are the state's interests that may counter the
individual's decision.255 These state interests are the same interests

75 See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (1986). "We conclude
that the trial court was incorrect when it held that the right to have life-support
equipment disconnected was limited to comatose, terminally ill patients, or
representatives acting on their behalf." Id.; see discussion supra part II.B.4 (analyzing
classifications of patients with respect to the right to die issue).
1'See Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician'sResponsibility Toward Hopelessly
Ill Patients, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 844, 848 (1989) (arguing that assisted suicide is
permissible when the patient is beyond all help, as determined by the physician, and not
merely suffering from depression, which can be treated by therapeutic means).
2S2Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
See supra note 224.
See generally Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299. In this case, it was argued that
Elizabeth Bouvia's ability to tolerate physical discomfort did not diminish her right to
immediate relief. Id. Her mental and emotional feelings are equally entitled to respect.
Id. Moreover, "she has a right to refuse the increased dehumanizing aspects of her
condition created by the insertion of an [artificial mechanism] into her stomach, and
therefore, she has the right to remove it." Id.
" See discussion supra part II.B.4.
211
2A
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that were present in the right to die cases.256 But, there has been a
fifth state interest, enunciated by at least one court in Nevada, that
tries to enhance the quality of life of those who are disabled."
Unfortunately, for patients in the final stages of a terminal illness,
whose quality of life can not be enhanced, the only thing that can be
done for them is to try and ease their suffering. However, for some
of these patients, the suffering is just too great because the treatment
merely extends their lives without alleviating their pain. 2 8 For these
patients, upon their consent, something should be done.
C. Arguments For and Against Assisted Self-Determination
Although actively taking one's own life is no longer
considered a crime in the United States, 259 it is generally considered
illegal to actively aid a person in committing suicide. 2 ° Currently,
at least two states have actively sought to legalize an individual's
right to receive assistance in dying. 26 ' Although both measures
failed, public opinion polls evidence popular support for these
measures. Today, majorities of up to sixty-four percent have favored
proposals that would permit a physician to actively end the suffering
of a terminal patient. 262 Even more striking is that seventy-nine

256The

state interests include: (1) the interest in preserving life; (2) the interest in

preventing suicide and homicide; (3) the interest in protecting innocent third parties; and
(4) the interest in preserving the ethical integrity of the medical profession. See
discussion supra part II.B.2.
See McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 628 (Nev. 1990).
28 See infra notes 263-67 and accompanying text (explaining that not all patients are
relieved of pain in the final days of life).
59See Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 64 (1992) (stating that
"[s]uicide or attempted suicide is not a crime under the criminal statutes of . . . any
state"). "No state interest is compromised by allowing [an individual] to experience a
dignified death rather than an excruciatingly painful life." Id. at 1622.
''
See Wolhandler, supra note 243, at 364 & n.10.
2 California and Washington are the two states that left this decision up to the
voters. In California, Proposition 116, was defeated by voters by a slim 46% to 54%
margin. See CeloCruz, supra note 224, at 371 n.l1. Washington's measure, Initiative
119, also lost by a similar margin. See Smith, supra note 235, at 503.
22 See Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections. 80
CAL. L. REV. 857, 860 & n.18 (1992).
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percent of adults under the age of thirty-five would permit physician
assisted suicide for terminally ill patients who requested it.263 To
understand why the legislation in the two states failed, the arguments
for and against the right to assisted self-determination must be
examined.264

Perhaps the most important argument for the legalization of
assisted self-determination is relief from pain and suffering.
Opponents of this argument stress that most physical pain can be
relieved by some type of medication.2 65 However, in cancer patients
alone, it has been reported that ten to fifteen percent of these patients
have significant pain and troublesome symptoms in the last few weeks
of life. 2
Furthermore, physicians often undertreat pain in
individuals who are severely ill because they are afraid to be
perceived as assisting in their death.267 One reason for inadequate
pain treatment is that physicians often lack knowledge regarding
proper pain management.268 Therefore, education about symptom
control, specifically pain management, is desperately needed and
should be fostered in this country.269
Another principle encompassed in this argument about pain
and suffering is referred to as the "double effect" principle, which
consists of performing an act with a good effect intended, which also

See Richard A. Knox, Poll. Americans Favor Mercy Killing, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 3, 1991, at 1.
I For purposes of this Note, the arguments for and against assisted suicide and
active euthanasia will be used.
' See BURNELL, supra note 86, at 256 (citing K. M. Foley, The Treatment of
CancerPain, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 84 (1985); Robert I. Misbin, Physicians'Aidin
Dying, 325 NEW ENO. J.MED. 1307 (1991)).
2' See BURNELL, supra note 86, at 255.
7 See Leslie Laurence, Physicians Ponder Dealing With Patient Choosing Death,
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 22, 1993, at 2. Dr. Timothy E. Quill stated that "[w]hen you're
afraid, the safest way to go is to underpalliate, undermedicate and keep going with
medical treatment. This is not good care. We need to make a commitment not to
abandon our dying patients." Id.
' See Kathleen M. Foley, The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to
Patient Requests for Physician-Assisted Suicide. 6 J.PAIN & SYMPTOM MOMT. 289,
290-91 (1991).
m6See id. at 291 (citing Sidney H. Wanzer et. al., The'Physician'sResponsibility
Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 320 NEw ENO. J. MED. 844 (1989)).
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Proponents of this
causes an indirect or unintended effect.2"'
death
is immoral, not
principle argue that while intending a patient's
intending that death but letting the patient die is not .271 However,
there really is no difference because the outcome for each is the
same. In a 1991 survey, nearly fifty percent of physicians polled
indicated that they have deliberately taken steps that would indirectly
cause a patient's death.2 72 Therefore, even though such a practice is
against the law, many physicians do assist their patients in their time
of need.
A physician's duty to assist a patient in his or her time of
need relates to the physicians responsibility to his patients. The
Hippocratic Oath states: "I [the physician] will neither give a deadly
drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this
effect."273 However, the World Medical Association issued an
updated version of the oath in 1948, which makes no mention of
deadly drugs.2 74 Furthermore, today, the Hippocratic oath is "sworn
to by only 6 percent of medical students [and m]odified versions 2of75
the oath are offered in 42 percent of the [medical] schools."
Technologies progress and values change. To strictly adhere to an
oath formed centuries ago is ludicrous, and denies the advancements
made in the medical sciences.276
Some critics also argue that this type of "treatment" will
adversely effect the current physician-patient relationship. This
argument insists that if a physician is permitted to assist some patients
in dying, this practice will "reduce the public's trust in doctors and
in the health care system."27 7 However, it is generally not treatment

"7 See Smith, supra note 235. This double effect principle is illustrated by Dr.
Timothy Quill in his much discussed article in The New England Journal of Medicine.
See Quill, supra note 225. Dr. Quill prescribed a lethal dose of barbiturates so that his
patient, Diane, could end her suffering. Id.
271See Smith, supra note 235, at 512.

BURNELL, supra note 86, at 259.
7 See id. at 344-45.
14 See id. at 64-65.
. Smith, supra note 235, at 516.

z72See

2 Furthermore, the Hippocratic Oath has already been violated by numerous doctors
who have performed abortions, and who have charged fees for teaching others the art
of medicine. See BURNELL, supra note 86, at 344-45.
See Newman, supra note 76, at 170.
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alternatives that affect trust in the physician-patient relationship. It
is the physicians professional attitude, degree of compassion, and
level of caring that wins or loses trust.278 Assisted self-determination
may actually foster this relationship because the dying experience is
truly profound, and to share it with someone who understands and
who will acknowledge the suffering "'surely must create one of the
most trusted bonds that can be possible.' ,,279
Additionally, assisted self-determination would not mandate
that physicians perform something that will violate their ethical code.
In a recent survey, seventy percent of physicians were found to have
supported the right of patients to choose active euthanasia. 280
Furthermore, depending on the case, "anywhere from 10 to 88
percent of physicians would accede to patients' requests for death if
all liability for civil and criminal liability were removed. "281 These
statistics illustrate that ethical codes are not the only factors that deter
physicians-liability is also a major deterrent. If the liability was
removed, perhaps more physicians would be willing to assist patients.
This would allow physicians who do not want to assist the dying
patient the added assurance that his or her patient's needs would be
addressed. To lay down a blanket rule and state that it is morally
against a physicians ethical code to assist a dying patient ignores
reality and is over-inclusive. Instead of fighting the patient, a
physician's primary goal should be to ease that patient's suffering
through treatment, medication, or by assistance in dying as a last
resort. 28 2

An argument has also been made that assisting the patient in
his or her death will ultimately result in a "slippery slope" effect,283
where allowing assisted suicide for some patients will lead to assisted

7 See id. at 171. "Doctors who display the traditional virtues-warmth, compassion,
skill and attentiveness-will win their patients' trust. Doctors who are too busy, too
machine oriented, or too emotionally frozen, will not." Id.
I Id. at 172 (quoting Should Physicians Perform Euthanasia?, AM. MED. NEWS
Jan. 7, 1991, at 12, 15 (response of Anne 1. Davis, Professor of Nursing Ethics,
University of California, San Francisco)).
280 See BURNELL, supra note 86, at 259.
28 Id.
282 See Smith, supra note 235, at 512-13.
n See, e.g., id. at 514; BURNELL, supra'note 86, at 257.
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suicide for others.2"4 However, this would ignore the fact that lines
are drawn and distinctions are often made.285 Instead of defining the
change in right to die legislation as being on a slippery slope, the
change is more appropriately defined as "a gradual recognition...
of one's right of self determination over against tradition, law, and
technology." 286 By accepting the slippery slope argument, one
believes that physicians are murderers, and do not care about their
patients. However, the majority of physicians in this country are
deeply dedicated, and only'care about their patients' well being and
happiness. They want to help ease their patient's suffering and most
presumably will go the extra step and assist in their death to
accomplish this end.287 When there is no hope there is no justifiable
reason to prolong suffering.
V. Closing Thoughts
When there is no hope left for a dying individual, the
knowledge that one has the legal right to end the suffering is often a
great consolation. Dying individuals need to know they are not alone
and that there are people who care about them. This Note does not
argue for an absolute right to assisted self-determination. The right
to assisted self-determination should, in all cases, be viewed as a
dying patient's last resort. 288 Advancements in technology occur
daily, and a patient must exhaust all avenues of treatment before
considering this "deeply personal decision of obvious and
overwhelming finality." 289 But once exhausted, the patient should
Smith, supra note 235, at 514. Some have suggested the slippery slope argument
has proven true, given the state of the right-to-die cases. See Clouser, supra note 10,
at 306.
" Smith, supra note 235, at 514-15. "If the argument were true, then legal abortion
should by now have led to legal infanticide." Id. at 515.
Clouser,
l6
supra note 10, at 307.
2 See Pugliese, supra note 57, at 1305 (finding that many physicians have privately
admitted that they have helped terminally ill patients end their suffering by prescribing
drugs potent enough to end their lives).
,[Plhysicians, like most people, still find death distasteful and prefer to help
people to continue living as long as there is still hope." Smith, supra note 235, at 517.
29 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
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have a right to end his or her suffering.
The Canadian Supreme Court recently decided this very
point."" Although, the Court, in a five-to-four ruling, denied the
individual's plea to be exempted from a criminal law making assisted
suicide illegal,291 one dissenter set out a number of conditions which
would have allowed the relief sought. 2" These conditions included:
permission from a superior court judge, certification of competency
and impending physical deterioration from a physician and
psychiatrist, mandatory presence by a doctor at the scene, daily
examinations, and that the final act be performed by the terminal
individual.293 While these guidelines are significant, 2 ' they fail to
290See

Rodriguez v. Attorney Gen. of Can., File No. 23476, Sept. 30, 1993, at 6

(holding that, in Canada, prohibition against assisting suicide is constitutional).
291 Id. at 3.
9 See David Vienneau, Court's Minority Defines Suicide Guidelines; Parliament
Could Use Rodriguez Case as Basisfor New Law, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 2, 1993, at B6.
I Rodriguez, File No. 23476, at 64-65 (Lamer C.J., dissenting). Canada's Chief
Justice Antonio Lamer's conditions included:
(1) A dying person must first apply to a superior court judge for
permission to end his or her life.
(2) A physician and a psychiatrist must certify in court that the
person wishing to die is competent to make the decision. They must
also confirm that the individual's decision was made freely and
voluntarily.
(3) A doctor must also agree to be present at the time the individual
commits assisted suicide.
.(4) The physician and psychiatrist must also certify that the dying
person will become physically incapable of committing suicide
unassisted and that they have advised the person of the right to a
change of mind.
(5) The dying person must be examined daily by one of the
that the individual
to ensure
physicians
certifying
still wishes to take his or her life.
(6) The act causing the death of the dying person must be done by
that individual. This would be done through medical/technological
means that would allow an extremely ill person to simply push a
button.
Id.
See id. Chief Justice Lamer's guidelines, at a minimum, show that proper
safeguards can be implemented in the area of assisted self-determination. See generally
Rodriguez, File No. 23476, at 52-65 (Lamer J., dissenting) (discussing safeguards that
need to be implemented). In the future, these guidelines will no doubt play an important
role in the continuing expansion of the right to die doctrine in Canada and possibly here
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protect those individuals who do not have the capacity to simply push
a button. For these patients who can not affirmatively cause their
own death, an added guideline should be included. The attending
physician, if he so consents, may affirmatively "push the button." If
the physician does not consent, he may defer to a second physician
who will be willing to perform the act. This requirement affords a
competent incapacitated individual the same rights as other
individuals, and also protects the physician if his ethical code forbids
him to actively assist in the process.
There is no justifiable reason to support why the individuals
in Scenarios 1 and 2295 at the beginning of this Note are not afforded
the same rights. Under Cruzan, the individual in Scenario 1 will
presumably not receive the assistance desired because this would
constitute active euthanasia.296 While the individual in Scenario 2 will
most probably get his wish under Cruzan.297 The only recognizable
difference between the two scenarios is time. For some, time is a
blessing, full of precious moments with family and friends. Many,
perhaps most, people want to hang on until the very last moment, and
relish what time they have left. These courageous people have the
right to live as long as they wish, in the condition they wish, and
deserve the finest treatment available.
But if someone has the right to live as long as he wishes, that
individual should also have the right to live as short as he wishes.
For these individuals, time is a dreaded curse, full of agony and
despair. An individual should not suffer because he "unfortunately"
has not reached the stage of his or her illness where life-sustaining
treatment is necessary. Whichever route they take, they deserve the
support and understanding of their family, physicians and, more
importantly, society. This Note does not contend that all terminally
or incurably ill people want to end their lives sooner than nature
intends. But, for those individuals who are in unbearable pain, the
state should not have the right to prolong suffering and despair
merely because of an abstract interest in the preservation of all life.

in the United States. See id. at 65 (stating that these guidelines may be used for future
petitioners who suffer from a condition similar to Ms. Rodriguez).
'5 See supra pp. 115-16.
9 But see supra note 8.
' See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 262, 277.
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Not long ago, an article was published in the Saturday
Evening Post describing a family's painful experience watching a
loved one waste away with cancer.298 The cancer was everywhere in
the patient, and was causing vomiting and uncontrollable bladder and
bowel movements. 29 9 The body was deteriorating, full of pain and
fatigue. 3" The patient's family finally realized that they "were
keeping [the loved one] alive for us, not for him . .

.

. For him,

relief.""30

death would surely be a welcomed
This painful story was
not describing a human being, although it very well could. It was
describing a beloved family dog, named Foxy.30 2
The title of this Note and the Saturday Evening Post article
illustrates that society has compassion and understanding for the
animal kingdom. The practice of euthanasia is humane for animals 0 3
but, presently, assisted-self determination is not for human beings.
It is time we show terminally ill individuals the same compassion,
understanding, and respect we show animals, and assist them when
they need the help the most.
Scott L Davidson

Diane D. Zentay, Farewell to Foxy, SATURDAY EvENING POST, Jan/Feb 1989,
at 22.
I" Id.
300 Id.
301 Id.

31 id. The final paragraph of the article stated that the veterinarian's best advice
was "to let the animal die with dignity, [w]hich is, after all, the best one could ask for
a human being." ,4d. at 22.
0 "If an animal is terminally ill, aged and suffering from a number of irreversible
ailments that cause it pain, or has suffered injuries from which no successful recovery
can be expected within a reasonably short period of time, euthanasia is unquestionably
the best and most humane solution." EMIL P. DOLENSEK & BARBARA BURN, THE
PENGuIN BOOK OF PETS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ANIMAL-KEEPING 307 (1978)

(emphasis added).

